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Abstract— For a wireless avionics communication system, a Multi-
arm bandit game is mathematically formulated, which includes 
channel states, strategies, and rewards. The simple case includes 
only two agents sharing the spectrum which is fully studied in 
terms of maximizing the cumulative reward over a finite time 
horizon. An upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm is used to 
achieve the optimal solutions for the stochastic Multi-arm bandit 
(MAB) problem. Also, the MAB problem can also be solved from 
the Markov game framework perspective. Meanwhile, Thompson 
sampling (TS) is also used as benchmark to evaluate the proposed 
approach performance. Numerical results are also provided 
regarding minimizing the expectation of the regret and choosing 
the best parameter for the upper confidence bound. 
Keywords—Multi-arm Bandit Game;Cognitive Raido Network; 
Dynamic Spectrum Access 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Avionics systems are dependent on communication capabilities 
for navigation and control [1][2]. A key element of future 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) would be wireless 
communications. However, the many possible UAS would be 
sharing the available spectrum for navigation and control.  
A wireless spectrum, regarded as a limited resource, has been 
investigated to increase the utility efficiency [1]. A Cognitive 
radio (CR) has been proposed to automatically adapt the 
communication system parameter to overcome the conflict 
between the great demand for spectrum and large amount of 
spectrum left available by Joseph Mitola III [3]. In a cognitive 
radio network (CRN), spectrum sensing provides the basis for 
the communication control center to dynamically allocate the 
spectrum resources without bringing harmful interference to 
other users [4][5].  
Recently, the spectrum allocation problem has been studied 
from the physical (PHY), medium access control (MAC), and 
network layers using different approaches such as 
communication theory, signal processing, graph theory, 
machine learning, and game theory; all of which involve 
computational complexity and communication overhead [6]. 
These approaches are advancing capabilities for avionics 
systems. Thus, a key problem arises as how to accommodate 
the different parts of communication system to balance the 
system spectrum utility and computation complexity 
constrained by the limited resources.  
In this paper, a new type of game is formulated to design the 
strategy that each communication node can dynamically select 
a candidate spectrum to transmit signal efficiently with the 
smallest accumulative regret.  
In the Multi-arm Bandit (MAB) game, which is originally 
proposed in [7], a gambler has to choose one of K machines to 
play. Each time, the gambler pulls the arm of one slot machine 
and receives a reward or payoff. The purpose of the game is to 
maximize the gambler's accumulative return or equivalently, 
the accumulative regret. The problem is a typical example of 
trade-off between the exploration and exploitation. If the player 
myopically focuses on the slot machine he thinks is the best, he 
may miss the actually best machine. On the other hand, if he 
spends most of time trying different slot machines, he may fail 
to play the best option enough often to gain an optimal reward. 
The traditional Multi-arm bandit game mostly depends on the 
assumptions about the statistics of the slot machine. 
In [8], a new type of Multi-arm bandit game is investigated, in 
which an adversary instead of a well behaved stochastic 
process, has complete control over the payoffs. It is proved that 
the proposed algorithm can achieve the best payoff arm at the 
rate of 𝑂(𝑇−
1
2) in a sequence of T plays. Considering the high 
computational complexity of solving stochastic dynamic games 
as the number of agents grow, the proposed mean-field 
approximation can be dramatically reduced. Also, a 
performance bound is derived to evaluate the approximation 
performance [9]. 
Considering the computability and plausibility limitation of the 
Markov perfect equilibrium, an approximation methodology 
also called mean field equilibrium is considered where agents 
optimize only with respect to the other players' average 
estimate, which is reasonable because it is impossible for each 
player to keep knowledge of other players all the time. The 
necessary condition for the existence of a mean field 
equilibrium in such games is derived and investigated [10]. The 
Multi-arm bandit game is a type of sequential optimization 
problem, where in successive trials, an agent pulls a random 
arm from a given set of arms of a certain size to receive 
corresponding reward from unknown priori. The agent can 
adjust his/her strategies by only observing his/her reward 
history. There might possibly exist a gap between the ideal 
maximum reward and actual reward because of the information 
shortage. Based on the basic bandit problem which involves 
only one agent, in this paper, the problem is generalized to 
multiple agents, where each agent’s decision will affect the 
other agents’ reward.   
Multi-arm bandit games come in two categories: stochastic and 
adversarial. In stochastic case, it is supposed that the players’ 
action doesn’t change each bandit’s reward probability 
distribution. While in adversarial case, based on the agent’s 
actions, each bandit will adjust its strategies minimizing the 
agent’s reward on the other side. Much research has been 
conducted related to the jamming effect and detection in 
communication systems. In[11][12], a stochastic game is 
characterized in the threat predication and situation awareness. 
Based on [11], a game theoretic situation awareness and impact 
assessment approach is further extended for cyber network 
defense to consider the change of threat intent during cyber 
conflict [13]. 
In [14][15], it is assumed that the system center is unware of the 
existence of the jammer, where the effect of the jamming signal 
is studied from the trace and determinant perspective. It is 
common to use Chi-Square detection using the determinant for 
jamming detection. It is shown that in [16] that the adversary 
can attack the system without being detected via taking 
advantage of the subspace of the measurement matrix. In [17], 
the jammer detection is further studied in a power system, 
where a data frame attack is optimally designed as a 
quadratically constrained quadratic program. It shows that only 
a half critical set of measurements are needed in order to make 
the system unobservable.  
If some prior information is accessible, Bayesian detection can 
be utilized for jamming detection. In [18], an improved 
Bayesian detection is designed that can minimize the system’s 
estimation error instead of minimizing the detection error. A 
minimum mean square error estimator is used as a benchmark 
for performance analysis. Also, the jamming effect is also 
studied from game perspective [19][20], where stochastic and 
two-person zero-sum games are designed to improve the threat 
detection. Also, since transponder designs have adopted more 
powerful onboard processing and multiple antennas to enhance 
the communication quality and robustness [21][22] that can be 
controlled for jamming mitigation.   
Overall, the contribution of this paper is summarized as 
follows: firstly, the Multi-arm bandit game is mathematically 
formulated, which includes the channel states, player strategy, 
and payoff reward. The simple case involves only two agents 
sharing the spectrum. The two-player spectrum sharing case is 
first fully studied in terms of maximizing the cumulative reward 
over a finite time horizon. An upper confidence bound (UCB) 
algorithm is used to achieve the optimal solutions for the 
stochastic MAB problems. Also, the problem can also be solved 
from the Markov game framework perspective. Meanwhile, 
Thompson sampling (TS) is also used as benchmark to evaluate 
the proposed approach performance.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows, Section II generally 
describes the spectrum allocation problem and the system 
model. Two approaches including the UCB and the Thompson 
sampling are mathematically described for comparison to the 
MAB approach. Numerical results are shown in Section III as 
applied to an avionics communication system for cyber 
protection. Section IV summarizes the paper.   
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Cognitive Radio Network 
Regarding the communication limitation for avionics systems, 
the spectrum is divided by time and frequency. The player can 
choose the frequency 𝑓𝑖 with the bandwidth 𝐵𝑖  to transmit the 
signal information or conduct jamming activity. For the 
cooperating case, it is important for each player to sense the 
vacuum spectrum hole to guarantee the signal transmission 
performance with low probability of interference. For the 
adversary case, the player’s objective is to choose the candidate 
spectrum hole to transmit the signal with a low probability of 
detection.  
B. Multi-arm Bandit (MAB) Formulation 
It is supposed that a game is played among 𝑛  players. A 
stochastic game defined as Ξ = (𝛘, 𝚨, 𝐏, Θ, α).  
Time: The game is played in discrete time, indexed by time 𝑡 =
1,2,3, ⋯, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: System Model 
State: For each player 𝑖, the state at time t is denoted as xi,t ∈ 𝛘, 
where 𝛘 ∈ 𝐑 is compact. 𝐱−i,t is used to denote the state of all 
the players except player 𝑖 at the time t.  
Strategy/Action: The action taken by each player i at time t is 
denoted as 𝑎i,t. The feasible action set for the state 𝑥 is denoted 
as 𝐴(x) ∈ R , 𝐀 =∪x∈𝛘 𝐴(𝑥) . It is assumed that 𝐴(x)  is 
compact, so 𝐀 is compact as well.  
Transition probability: It is supposed that players evolve 
strategies based on the Markov process. Given that xi,t = 𝑥 ∈
𝛘, ai,t = 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴(𝑥), x−𝑖,𝑡 = 𝝃, the next state for player i can be 
characterized based on Borel probability measure P(⋅ |x, a, 𝝃), 
 
P(𝑆|x, a, 𝝃) = P(xi,t+1 ∈ S|xi,t = 𝑥, ai,t = 𝑎, x−𝑖,𝑡 = 𝝃) (1) 
where Borel sets S ∈ 𝛘. Based on Equation (1), given the current 
state for all players and action a for player i, the state x𝑖,𝑡+1  is 
independent of all the other past states during the game.  
Payoff/Reward: the payoff for player i at the time t is denoted 
as 
r = Θ(xi,t, ai,t, 𝐱−𝑖,𝑡) (2) 
Based on different types of payoffs, the Multi-arm bandit 
(MABs) game can be categorized as stochastic MABs, 
adversarial MABs, and Markovian MABs.  
Discount factor: 𝛼 is the discount factor and the corresponding 
payoff for a player till time T can be characterized as,  
𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝛼
𝑇−𝑗Θ(xi,t, ai,t, 𝐱−𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
(3) 
It is supposed that a gambler faces 𝑁 slot machines trying to 
find a strategy that can maximize the average reward 𝑅𝑡 =
∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑖 ∈ (1, … , 𝑛) , where 𝑅𝑡  denotes the accumulative 
reward over a finite time horizon, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  denotes the reward for 
each time index 𝑡  by choosing the arm i. Let 𝑟∗  denote the 
maximum reward if the player’s action is supposed to be best 
for each round, so the goal for the gambler is to minimize the 
expectation of accumulative regret. In this paper, the discount 
factor 𝛼 = 1, the problem can be characterized as  
max
𝑖𝑡∈(1,…,𝑛)
∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
  
(4) 
 
Regret: After T rounds, regret is defined as the difference 
between the sum of the collected rewards and the sum 
associated with an optimal strategy rewards. The regret of an 
action set 𝚨 over the sequence (𝒓1, … , 𝒓𝑇) is given by  
𝑅𝑇(𝑨) = 𝑅(𝒓1,…,𝒓𝑇)(𝑨) = max𝑖∈(1,…,𝑛)
∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
− ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
(5)   
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝑡 ∈ 𝑟
∗ is the optimal strategy for each round. 
For the player, the goal is typically to minimize the regret 
discussed above from either expectation, or with high 
probability based on the way how the rewards are generated. To 
determine the performance, a bound is set for an algorithm from 
either expectation or the high probability the reward for which 
the decision of the draw is selected. 
As for the stochastic MABs, the objective function (5) above is 
investigated from the expectation perspective, which can be 
characterized as, 
𝑬𝒓1,…,𝒓𝑇
[ max
𝑖∈(1,…,𝑛)
∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
− ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
] 
 
(6) 
Because the 𝑚𝑎𝑥(∙)  is inside the expectation operation, the 
objective function is hard to solve. Usually, the pseudo-regret 
objective function is considered when designing the MABs 
algorithm,  
𝑅𝑇(𝑨) = max
𝑖∈(1,…,𝑛)
𝐸𝒓1,…,𝒓𝑇
[∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
− ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
]
= max
𝑖∈(1,…,𝑛)
𝐸𝒓1,…,𝒓𝑇
∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
− 𝐸𝒓1,…,𝒓𝑇
= 𝑇𝑢∗ − ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
(7) 
where 𝑢∗denotes the highest mean reward among the arms 𝑖 ∈
(1, … , 𝑛), and 𝑢𝑖 denotes the reward mean for arm i.  
For the cognitive radio network, an arm is regarded as one 
channel candidate in the limited spectrum resources. For each 
player i, the strategy is a function over the time t. The strategy is 
supposed that each player makes his/her own decision, which 
can be characterized as, 
{𝑥𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 , Φ𝑡}𝑖=1
𝑇−1
, ?̂?𝑖.𝑡 → 𝑎𝑖,𝑇  
(8) 
The Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm is often used to 
find the optimal solution. Let 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 denote the total times that arm 
i has been chosen for the first T trials, 
𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = Σ𝑡=1
𝑇 1(𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖) (9) 
𝑎nd ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 denotes the sample mean rewards obtained by pulling 
the arm i for the first T trials, 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
Σ𝑡=1
𝑇 1 ∙ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡(𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖) 
(10) 
The UCB algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.  
Algorithm 1: Upper Confidence Bound 
 
1 Parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] 
2 For 𝑡 =  1, … , 𝑇 
3 
𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖∈(1,…,𝑛)(?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + √
𝛼ln𝑡
2𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
) 
4 Set 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1 if 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖 
 Else 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 
5 Receive new reward 𝑟𝑖∗,𝑡 
 
C. Thompson sampling 
As for the Thompson sampling, it is assumed that the player has 
some prior knowledge of the posterior distribution of the reward 
for each arm. For each arm, the player starts from a prior 
information on the parameters of the distribution of reward for 
each arm i. The posterior distribution of the reward for each arm 
is updated by taking advantage of the received observation. The 
best arm is selected based on the updated posterior probability. 
In this paper, the Bernoulli Multi-arm Bandit game is studied. 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)  is usually selected as the prior information. The 
Thompson Sampling algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.  
 
Algorithm 2: Thompson sampling 
1 Initialization:  
   scale parameter 𝜃𝑖,1~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1), 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 0, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 0 
2 t = t+1 
3 For each 𝑖 ∈ (1, … 𝑛), 
   𝜃𝑖,𝑡~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 
4 Choose 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖(𝜃𝑖,𝑡) 
5 Go to step 2 
 
III. NUMERICAL RESULT 
In this section, the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm 
is implemented in selecting the available spectrum block to 
transmit the signal. It is supposed that the operator is facing four 
spectrum candidates regarded as four arms denoted as  𝐴1, 𝐴2, 
𝐴3, 𝐴4, which follow one of the four distributions:  
1) Bernoulli distribution 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖(1,0.5), 
2) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(4,12),  
3) Exponential distribution with 𝜆 = 9, or  
4) Finite elements ([0.25 0.5 0.75 1])  with probability 
([0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1]).  
The corresponding means derived based on the distribution 
discussed above are 0.5, 0.25, 0.11, and 0.55.  
In the first simulation, the UCB algorithm is used to maintain 
the confidence intervals for the various mean rewards for each 
arm. For each given trial, the UCB algorithm chooses the arm 
with the highest upper confidence bound up to the current time 
t. In our simulation, 𝛼 is set to be in the range(0.1,1), and the 
step size is 0.14. The best 𝛼 is selected based on Equation (3). 
The estimation of reward mean is updated in each iteration 
through ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + √
𝛼ln𝑡
2𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
), 𝑖 ∈ (1, … , 𝑛). The bench mark used in 
the simulation is that the player just chooses the arm of the 
highest sample mean, which is equivalently to 𝛼 = 0 . The 
reward average and the regret average considering the different 
𝛼 values are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 4. Figure 4 shows 
that the UCB algorithm outperforms the naïve algorithm in 
terms of average reward. The UCB algorithm with 𝛼 = 0.0464 
achieves the most average reward.  
 
Figure 2 Average regret via UCB with different 𝛼 value 
 
 
 
Figure 3: System performance between UCB and Thompson 
 
Figure 4: Average reward via UCB with different 𝛼 value 
In the second simulation, there are four spectrum candidates 
satisfying the Bernoulli distribution with mean 0.20, 0.23, 0.25, 
and 0.21. The optimal 𝛼 is achieved based on simulation from 
the range(0.1, 1) set the same as Simulation 1. As for the 
Thompson sampling methods, the scale parameter is 𝜃𝑖,1 
𝜃𝑖,1~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) . From the simulation shown in Figure 3, a 
200000 times Monte Carlo run is conducted in the simulation. 
It is shown that the UCB with the optimal 𝛼 outperforms the 
Thompson sampling algorithm. The average reward between 
UCB and Thompson sampling is shown in Figure 5. In general, 
it is not practical to assume that the reward for certain arm 
satisfies either a Bernoulli or a Gaussian distribution, because 
Thompson sampling is not a Bayesian posterior sampling 
algorithm for general stochastic Multi-arm bandit games. 
However, the Thompson sampling is an online algorithm that 
provides a baseline for comparison. From Figure 5, it is shown 
that both algorithms can achieve comparatively good system 
performance.  
 
Figure 5: Average reward between UCB and Thompson sampling 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the Multi-arm bandit game is applied in the 
dynamically spectrum selection for avionics communications. 
Firstly, the Multi-arm bandit mathematically formulated, which 
includes channel activities, player strategy, and payoff reward. 
The simple case where only two agents get involved in sharing 
the spectrum is first fully studied in terms of maximizing the 
cumulative reward over a finite time horizon. The upper 
confidence bound (UCB) is used to achieve the optimal 
solutions for the stochastic MAB problems. Also, the problem 
can also be solved from the Markov game framework 
perspective. Meanwhile, Thompson sampling (TS) is also used 
as benchmark to evaluate the proposed approach performance. 
Future work includes applying the methods for a space 
communications scenario [23] and for coordination of UAVs 
[24]. These testbeds would incorporate the methods to provide 
robust communication in an adversarial environment.  
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